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ON THE CONTINGENT NECESSITY OF THE WORLD 
[Draft for the Gratitude Project. Comments welcome]. 
1. Introduction  
 The most widely accepted metaphysics of creation is theistic actualism. Theistic 
actualism is committed to the view that everything that exists, in the most unrestricted 
sense, is included in the actual world. According to the metaphysics of theistic actualism, 
there is a unique, absolutely actual world. And God's creative activity explains why the 
actual world obtains and why actual beings exist.  Since we are the undeserving recipients 
of our own existence, and our existence is a great good to us, gratitude to God is both 
appropriate and morally required. I discuss the account of creation in theistic actualism in 
section (2).  
 In section (3) I consider the most serious problem for the traditional account of 
divine creation in theistic actualism. According to Peter van Inwagen's modal collapse 
argument, ultimate explanation entails that gratitude for one's existence is totally 
inappropriate. Ultimately, the actual world, and everything in it, is self-explanatory and 
not a consequence of divine creation. 
 In section (4) I argue that van Inwagen's argument is unsound. It is consistent 
with an ultimate explanation for the world that the actual world is contingently necessary. If 
God actualizes the world as a matter of necessity—specifically, contingent necessity—
then gratitude to God for one's existence is perfectly appropriate. It is true that we exist 
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as a matter of necessity, but that necessary existence is just a contingent fact. There are 
possible worlds in which we fail to exist altogether.  
 In section (5) I offer some concluding remarks in defense of weakening the 
background logic in philosophical theology to Kρσ (B) from S5.   
2. Creation in Theistic Actualism 
 According to theistic actualism the totality of creation—everything that exists, 
obtains, or occurs—is contained in the actual world. There are other possible worlds, 
other ways things might have been, but even those worlds are contained in the actual 
world. If there exist impossible worlds—worlds where everything is possible and nothing 
is necessary—then those too exist in the actual world. There are in any case impossible 
world-like objects existing in the actual world. So all possible and impossible worlds, 
insofar as those worlds exist, are actual objects.  
 But possible, non-actual, objects do not exist in the actual world and so do not 
exist simpliciter. It is true that Wittgenstein might have had a daughter, as the familiar 
example goes, but there is no actual object that is Wittgenstein's possible daughter. So 
Wittgenstein's possible daughter does not exist.  It is an odd feature of theistic actualism 
that possible objects exist in possible worlds and possible worlds exist in the actual world, 
but possible objects do not exist in the actual world. 'Exist in' is oddly non-transitive on 
theistic actualism. 
 The object of divine creation is in fact the actual universe or the actual multiverse. 
It is of course possible on theistic actualism that a world contains no spatiotemporal 
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regions at all and so contains no universe(s) at all. There are world with no universes, and 
worlds with empty universes. A universe is the largest spatiotemporally connected region 
in a possible world and includes every spatiotemporally located concrete object in a 
world. Tigers, humans, water, aluminum, clouds, impure sets, talking donkeys, waves, 
thoughts and pains are concrete objects existing in a universe. But there are also objects 
with force but no mass, photons are candidates, and there are objects located but 
unextended, point-sized objects, for instance, and objects that are unextended in both 
space and time such as temporal parts. These are all candidates for concrete objects 
existing in a universe. Not all of them exist in our universe. Pure sets, numbers, 
geometrical objects, meanings, propositions, properties, and God are all examples of 
objects not existing in any universe.   
 According to the metaphysics of creation in theistic actualism, God creates every 
contingently existing concrete object in the universe. The creation of contingent objects 
is specifically the instantiation of proxy objects or sets of properties comprising the 
individual essences of objects. In order to create Smith, for instance, and not merely an 
indiscernible counterpart of Smith, God must instantiate a set of properties that belong 
to Smith uniquely. These are Smith's haecceities, the properties that Smith alone 
exemplifies in every world in which she exists and no other object exemplifies in any 
possible world. But what then about objects like Mt McKinley? Presumably, if Mt. 
McKinley is a genuine object, then God creates Mt. McKinley just if God instantiates the 
 4 
individual essence of Mt. McKinley, and so on.  In general, creation is instantiation on 
this view. 
 The creation of contingent objects in the universe entails the actualization of 
contingent state of affairs in the actual world. Creation is not identical to actualization, 
but entails actualization. In creating Smith atop Mt. McKinley, for instance, God 
actualizes the state of affairs of Smith's being on top of Mt. McKinley. Apart from the 
creation of contingent, spatiotemporal objects, everything that God thinks and does also 
brings about states of affairs in the actual world. God brings about the state of affairs of 
God's being impressed by a certain set of reasons for creating by being impressed by 
those reasons. God brings about God's believing that creation is good by believing that it 
is good and God brings about God's being moved to create the Gobi desert by being 
moved to create the Gobi.  
 Possible worlds on this account are not collections of spatiotemporal connected 
objects. Possible worlds are maximally consistent abstract states of affairs. The largest or 
most inclusive object requiring explanation is the actual world—the actual world in its 
totality. The actual world in its totality is the one and only maximal state of affairs that in 
fact obtains. Every state of affairs S or its negation ~S is included in the actual world, and 
it could not include even one more state of affairs. In divine creation, God brings about 
or actualizes the largest consistent collection of states of affairs. God could not actualize 
one more state of affairs without actualizing an impossible world. There are further no 
states of affairs that obtain, but that are not included in the actual world. 
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 Divine creation, according to theistic actualism, involves God choosing one 
possible world to actualize from infinitely many possible worlds. Since the infinitely many 
worlds are all possible, God might have actualized any one of them. And since worlds are 
maximally inclusive, God's actualization of a possible world is the actualization of 
absolutely everything that contingently obtains. Since God's creative activity contingently 
actualizes the world, according to theistic actualism, God might have actualized some 
other possible world. In section (3) I argue that it is impossible that God contingently 
actualizes the world. 
3. Van Inwagen on Ultimate Explanation  
 According to Peter van Inwagen, Jonathan Bennett, William Rowe, and several 
other philosophers, there could be no absolute explanation for the actual world.  Absolute 
explanations are in fact the best sorts of explanations—explanations on which, according 
to Richard Swinburne, 'everything really is explained'. The problem with absolute 
explanations, according to van Inwagen, is that they are incompatible with the 
contingency of the actual world. If there is an absolute explanation for the actual world, 
then there are no contingent objects, events, or states of affairs. Here is Swinburne's 
account of absolute explanation. 
. . . let us delineate a special kind of ultimate explanation, which I shall call 
absolute explanation. An absolute explanation of E is an ultimate 
explanation of E in which the existence and operation of each of the 
factors cited are either self-explanatory or logically necessary. Other 
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explanations cite brute facts that form the starting points of explanations; 
there are no brute facts in absolute explanations—here everything really is 
explained.1 
But Swinburne also denies that there could be an absolute explanation for the actual 
world.  
I do not believe that there can be any absolute explanations of logically 
contingent phenomena . . . You cannot deduce anything logically 
contingent from anything logically necessary . . . These are among the many 
reasons why it must be held that God is a logically contingent being, 
although maybe one necessary in other ways.2  
 Absolute explanations are in fact the only explanations that satisfy the principle of 
sufficient reason. The unfortunate consequence of the absolute explanation of the actual 
world, according to van Inwagen, is complete modal collapse. 
 For every state of affairs that obtains, there is a sufficient reason for 
its obtaining. . . PSR must be rejected, for it has an absurd consequence: the 
collapse of all modal distinctions. . . In order to see this we must take a 
brief look at the concept of a sufficient reason. . . First, if x is a sufficient 
reason for y, then x must entail y. That is, it must be impossible for x to 
obtain without y's obtaining. For if it were possible for x to obtain and y to 
fail to obtain, how could the obtaining of x be a sufficient reason for the 
obtaining of y? Second, no contingent state of affairs may be its own 
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sufficient reason. . . We may now show that PSR leads to the collapse of all 
modal distinctions. Let P be the conjunction of all contingently true 
propositions into a single proposition. . . . It is evident that P itself is a 
contingent proposition, for a necessary proposition may not have a single 
contingent conjunct. Now, according to PSR, there exists a state of affairs S 
that is a sufficient reason for P. S must be contingent or necessary. But it 
cannot be either. It cannot be necessary, for, if it were necessary then P 
(which, by our first principle, is entailed by S) would be necessary. It cannot 
be contingent, for if it were contingent it would be a conjunct of P; and if it 
were a conjunct of P . . . it would be P. . . Since S cannot be either 
necessary or contingent, it cannot exist and PSR is false. . . Hence if PSR is 
true, there are no truths but necessary truths: there is no distinction to be 
made between truth and necessity.3 
 Let the conjunction of all contingent truths be w@. According to van Inwagen's 
argument against contingent creation, (i) a contingent state of affairs S cannot explain the 
actual world w@ since every contingent state of affairs is included in w@ and (ii) no 
contingent state of affairs is self-explanatory.  
 Van Inwagen does not note that the argument against God's contingent creation 
of the actual world—and against the contingent explanation of a world generally—is 
valid only if we assume a logic at least as strong as S5. According to S5, every necessary 
state of affairs is necessarily necessary. Since S5 precludes the possibility of contingently 
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necessary states of affairs, it is impossible that a contingently necessary state of affairs S 
explains w@—that is, explains why w@ obtains or is actual. And since it is impossible that 
a contingently necessary state of affairs S explains w@, it is impossible that there are any 
contingently self-explanatory states of affairs. Assuming S5, then, it is true that no contingent 
state of affairs could provide an absolute explanation for w@.   
 But van Inwagen's argument against God's necessary creation of the actual 
world—and against a necessary explanation of a world generally—is invalid even if we 
assume a logic as strong as S5. According to van Inwagen's argument against necessary 
creation, a necessary state of affairs S cannot explain w@ since (iii) w@ is a maximally 
consistent, contingent state of affairs and (iv) every necessary explanation S for a 
contingent state of affairs w@ entails that w@ is necessary.  
 Van Inwagen fails to observe that there cannot be a necessary explanation S for 
the state of affairs w@ quite independently of the contingency w@ or the necessity of w@. 
It is in general false that S provides any explanation of w@ even on the assumption that  
 S and  (S ⟶ w@). It is in general true that w@ is self-explanatory on the assumption 
that  S and  (S ⟶ w@). In S5 a state of affairs w@ is self-explanatory only if w@ is 
necessarily self-explanatory. So it is impossible that God necessarily creates or necessarily 
explains w@. w@ can only explain itself. 
 So under the assumption of S5 it is impossible that God's creative activity is the 
absolute explanation for the actual world. Ultimately w@ exists necessarily and so is self-
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explanatory.4 And since the fact that w@ obtains is not explained by God's creative 
activity, gratitude to God for one's existence is simply inappropriate.   
4. On Contingently Necessary Creation. 
 According to van Inwagen's modal argument against contingent creation, no 
contingent state of affairs S can explain the actual world w@, since every contingent state 
of affairs is included in w@ and no contingent state of affairs is self-explanatory.  But van 
Inwagen's argument depends entirely on the assumption that the logic of modality is at 
least as strong as S5. And that assumption is almost certainly false. 
 In the weakened logic Kρσ, (or B) for instance, it is false that no contingent state of 
affairs are self-explanatory.5 There are in fact contingently necessary states of affairs, and 
contingently necessary states of affairs are themselves contingently self-explanatory. 
Contingently self-explanatory states of affairs are self-explanatory in the way that all 
necessary states of affairs are self-explanatory. But since they are contingently necessary, 
there are some possible worlds in which they are self-explanatory and some possible 
worlds in which they're not.  
 Contingently necessary states of affairs can provide contingent absolute 
explanations for  possible worlds. God might have actualized a possible world as a matter 
of contingent necessity, for instance. If the explanation for why a possible world obtains 
is contingently necessary, then the world itself obtains as a matter of contingent necessity. 
There are other possible worlds that could have been necessarily actualized and could 
have necessarily obtained.  
 10 
 If we let P be a maximal conjunction of propositions true at the actual world w@, 
then we can describe a simple model permitting contingently necessary worlds. In fact 
there are any number of more or less complex models permitting contingently necessary 
worlds in Kρσ. In the following model, for instance, w@  necessarily obtains and so the 
principle of sufficient reason is satisfied at w@.  But w@ is contingently necessary, so there 
are worlds at which P is false and worlds at which  P is false. 
            w@:            P &   P  
                     ↕︎                 
   w1:         P & ~  P  ↔︎  w2:  P' & ~ P'  ↔︎  w3:  P' 
The model shows where the van Inwagen argument goes wrong. It is true at w@ that  P, 
but also true that ◊~ P. Every state of affairs in w@ is either necessarily necessary or 
contingently necessary. Since it is true that  P, every state of affairs in w@ has an absolute 
explanation—everything is fully explained—but since it is also true in that ◊~  P, there 
are possible worlds in which at least some of the conjuncts of P are false. The truth of 
◊~ P ensures contingency in w@ despite the fact that  P is true there. Since it is 
contingently necessary that God actualized w@, another possible world might have been 
actual.  
 It is true in some models for Kρσ that not every possible world has direct access to 
every other possible world. In the small model above, for instance, every world has either 
direct or indirect access to every other world. w1 is possible relative to w@, and w2 is 
possibly possible, and so on. But there are some models for S5, too, in which each world 
has access to itself alone, or to a small isolated cluster of worlds. S5 validates all of the 
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theorems of Kρσ, and that's good, but S5 also validates a number of equivalences that 
conflate important distinctions in philosophical theology.  
 In the simple model it is true that the only world directly accessible to and from 
w@ is w1, but this feature is not essential to the model. There might be infinitely many 
possible worlds accessible to and from w@. There might be as many possible worlds 
accessible to and from w@ as there are in the entire pluriverse. It is perfectly possible to 
have vast regions of the pluriverse satisfy S4 or S5 theorems, if you like, or propositions 
that approximate those theorems.6 
            w@:                  P &   P  
                       ↕︎        ⤡          
   w1:         P &   P  ↔︎  w2:  P &  P  
         ⤡    ↕︎   
           w3: P & ~  P 
           ↕︎ 
    w4: P' & ~  P' 
 
In this simple model, P is again contingently necessary at w@, and God's creative activity 
provides an absolute explanation for every state of affairs in w@. PSR is again satisfied. In 
w3 and w4 P is not necessary at all. Note that in w@ and w1 all of the S5 theorems are 
true, including  P ⟶   P, ◊  P ⟶  P, ◊P ⟶  ◊P and so on. Those theorems are 
in fact contingently necessary in w@ and w1 and regionally govern necessity and 
possibility in w@ and w1. For anyone who has doubts about rejecting the S5 theorems, 
Kρσ does not preclude S5 from governing necessity and possibility in your part of the 
pluriverse. But that would be a matter of contingent fact. Kρσ ensures that those 
theorems are false in other regions of metaphysical space.   
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 God might have actualized w2 or w3 instead of w@, as the theistic actualist says, 
simply by instantiating the objects existing in those worlds with the properties those 
objects exemplify in those worlds. God might have actualized a world, for instance, in 
which none of us exist or only some of us do. So, though it is true that we necessarily 
exist, it is a contingent fact that we necessarily exist. It is true that w@ is necessarily 
actual, but that too is just a contingent fact about w@. It is also true that w@ is possibly 
not necessarily actual. w@ is in fact a contingently necessary world.  
 The small model also shows that God might have necessarily actualized w2 instead 
of w@. Had God actualized w2, then it would have been true that the principle of 
sufficient reason was fully satisfied. God's creative activity would have provided an 
absolute explanation for w2 and everything in w2 would have been fully explained. The 
model shows that it's false that no contingent state of affairs is self-explanatory, since  P 
is both contingent and self-explanatory.  The model also shows that it's false that there 
are no contingent explanations for necessary maximal states of affairs. w@ is a necessary 
maximal state of affairs and w@ has a contingent explanation.  
5. Theism and Kρσ 
 Van Inwagen's argument against contingent and necessary explanation implicitly 
assumes the logic of S5—as do the similar arguments from Bennett, Rowe, Geirsson, 
Ross, and others.  It is the S5 theorems that guarantee that there are no contingently 
necessary states of affairs, no contingently necessary explanations, and no contingently 
self-explanatory states of affairs.7 But it is the possibility of contingently necessary states 
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of affairs that makes it possible to provide an absolute explanation for a possible world 
without modal collapse.  
 S5 generates a number of other problems for philosophical theology. Since S5 is 
such a strong logic, it conflates a number of philosophically important distinctions. For 
instance, given the logic of S5, we are unable to distinguish between strongly negative 
states of affairs and weakly negative states of affairs.8 We are unable to distinguish 
between states of affairs that provide some evidence against the existence of God and states 
of affairs that provide conclusive evidence against the existence of God.9 We are also unable 
to distinguish between weakly positive and strongly positive states of affairs. That is, we 
cannot distinguish between states of affairs that provide some evidence in favor of the 
existence of God and states of affairs that provide conclusive evidence in favor of the 
existence of God. In S5, every weakly negative state of affairs is logically equivalent to a 
strongly negative state of affairs. This is just to say that any state of affairs that provides 
he slightest evidence against the existence of God also provides conclusive evidence 
against the existence of God. Weakly positive states of affairs suffer from a perfectly 
analogous problem. 
 S5 entails the incredible metaphysical position that either we inhabit a miserable 
pluriverse or we inhabit an impeccable pluriverse.10 There are no other alternatives. If we 
inhabit an impeccable pluriverse, then every possible state of affairs provides conclusive 
evidence in favor of God's existence. In the impeccable pluriverse every weakly negative 
or neutral state of affairs is impossible. If we do not inhabit an impeccable pluriverse, 
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then we inhabit a miserable pluriverse. In a miserable pluriverse, every possible state of 
affairs provides conclusive evidence against God's existence.  In a miserable pluriverse all 
weakly positive and neutral states of affairs are impossible.  
 S5 does not permit us to distinguish between exemplifying essential properties 
necessarily and exemplifying essential properties contingently11. It is impossible for God 
or anything else to acquire an essential property it does not already exemplify or to lose 
an essential property it does exemplify. It is impossible, for instance, that God might 
acquire a human nature—as so many theists believe both possible and actual. And it is 
impossible to lose the essence of humanity, if God does exemplify it. It is impossible, to 
consider another familiar example, that anything that is essentially water should become 
essentially wine. It cannot happen as a matter of the logic of essential properties. S5 rules 
out the possibility of such changes on logical grounds.  
 On the other hand, Kρσ  is consistent with traditional theism and avoids the 
unwelcome consequences listed above. In Kρσ weakly negative states of affairs do not 
entail that the traditional God does not exist. Weakly positive states of affairs do not 
entail that the traditional God does exist. So, the weakly negative fact that Jones endures 
a serious harm is consistent with the existence of God. And the weakly positive facts that  
Jones leads a fulfilling life or Smith is reasonably virtuous are consistent with the non-
existence of God.  And there are simple countermodels in Kρσ to the thesis that we 
inhabit either a miserable pluriverse or an impeccable pluriverse.    
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 Kρσ allows us to model some features of metaphysical space that are inconsistent 
in S5. It is possible that the traditional God exists and it is also possible that there obtains 
widespread intrinsically evil states of affairs. Further, it is possible that the traditional 
God does not exist and also possible that some worlds are naturally and morally perfect. 
In the simple four-world model below, the traditional God exists in w0, but the 
traditional God does not exist in world w3. The double-arrows indicate accessibility, 
every world is assumed to have access to itself. Let ◻FG represent God is essentially 
omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect.  
 w0:                   ◻FG (God is essentially Fx) 
                   ↕︎                ⤡ 
 w1:            ◻FG     ↔︎     w2:   FG (God is Fx)  ↔︎  w3: ~FG (God is not Fx)  
 It is true at w0 that, in every possible world, God exemplifies omnipotence, 
omniscience, and moral perfection. Since it is a matter of philosophical dispute whether 
the S5 principle ◻FG ⟶ ◻◻FG is true, Kρσ  allows us to model various positions on this 
issue. The question of whether ◻FG ⟶ ◻◻FG is true of the essential properties of God 
depends on how the theological dispute is settled. Different positions are representable in  
Kρσ. 
 The worlds that are possible at w0 are w1 and w2, but of course there are likely 
infinitely many worlds—as many worlds as there are in all of metaphysical space— 
possible at w0.  These are enough worlds to represent every possibility. But there are also 
absolutely possible worlds—w3 for instance—in which the traditional God does not exist 
and there obtains widespread intrinsic evil. Whether there are infinitely many absolutely 
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possible worlds in which there is intrinsic evil is a metaphysical issue and Kρσ can 
represent a variety of views on the matter. It is possible to model the position according 
to which the essential properties of God are contingently non-contingent, and virtually 
any other plausible view. That issue in Kρσ is philosophical and not logical. It's crucial 
that Kρσ does not rule out on logical grounds positions that have at least some 
philosophical merit. 
 In the simple four-world model, the dispute between traditional theists and 
traditional atheists is whether the actual world is w0 or w3. The dispute does not involve 
either the traditional atheist or the traditional theist holding an absolutely impossible 
position. Each of the positions is absolutely possible. There is, as we should expect, more 
or less significant evidence in favor and against theism and atheism throughout the 
pluriverse. The pluriverse is not a collection of exclusively positive states of affairs or a 
collection of exclusively negative states of affairs.  
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